The paper relies implicitly on the Von Neumann-Wigner interpretation of quantum physics, which has consciousness as an assumption. So the paper is part of a circle argument. [1]
On top of that, this interpretation is very controversial to say the least. In most interpretations, the role of the 'observer' is left in the middle, as there is no good reason to assume it should be conscious.
> Because the observables correspond
to the reference frame of the observer and they exist in the complex Hilbert
space, it must be concluded that, unlike reference frames in classical physics,
quantum observables correspond to an observer’s reference frame in thought.
The whole argument rests on this sentence, which is just pure nonsense. There's nothing about Hilbert spaces that has anything to do with conscious thought; the conclusion is a complete non sequitur. The context of the sentence doesn't add anything to support such a notion, either.
This is just another in a long line of people putting way too much stock in the very unfortunate choice of the word "observation" as used in QM.
>A certain phenomenon of consciousness is demonstrated to be fully represented as a computational process using a quantum computer. Based on the computability criterion discussed with Turing machines, the model constructed is shown to necessarily involve a non-computable element.
So, the universe contains uncomputable physics?
Some aspect of quantum computing is uncomputable (beyond mere exponential slowdown in a classical simulation)?
Edit: those two claims are at least as interesting as anything about consciousness, but much more amenable to further study!
Right. The paper also only takes a few seconds to identify as bullshit: rather than having any claims whatsoever about biology or how the human brain in particular depends on quantum behavior, it just takes the Copenhagen-interpretation concept of "observer" over-literally.
While others may have more credible claims that the brain's operation depends on quantum behavior, my inclination is to be highly skeptical due to the basic nature of biology combined with the bias you cite.
Because our experience of the world is the thing we hold most dear. We associate it with our identity, to the point where the two seem inseparable. The idea that we are "in the world, but not of it" is very deeply ingrained. Our tendency towards introspection alienates us from nature, and leads us to the conclusion that there must be something that sets us apart from the rest of the animal kingdom. Just about everyone has a deep-seated desire to be special, to be destined for a higher purpose -- and that view is not (generally) compatible with the notion that consciousness is an emergent physical phenomenon, rather than evidence of a soul.
I don't think it is justified to say that consciousness is not a riddle. There is no evidence that consciousness is more than the product of the complex physical processes happening in our brain but I don't think that makes the issue any less puzzling. How does a collection of particles completely governed by physical laws become conscious? If consciousness is just an emergent property of an incredible complex state machine than any implementation would have to be conscious, the often quoted simulation of a brain inside a computer as well as a gigantic pile of levers, gears and pulleys in the right arrangement. The thought that a collection of gears can become aware of its existence seems, at least to me, pretty outlandish.
> The thought that a collection of gears can become aware of its existence seems, at least to me, pretty outlandish.
I mean, it's less exciting when you break that down into the what it means for a person to be aware of themselves. For me, it breaks down to neurons & symbols, well-known scientific domains. While I may not be right, it's not difficult to come up with plausible explanations for the phenomena humans experience. Most of the mystery comes from it being very difficult for most people to even define consciousness. Much of the syntax we have for it (in the west, at least) is cobbled together from various religions, spiritualities, and extremely, extremely dense philosophers read by few and understood by fewer.
You might find Richard Hofstadter's Book "I Am A Strange Loop" illuminating if you find my explanation meager.
>I mean, it's less exciting when you break that down into the what it means for a person to be aware of themselves. For me, it breaks down to neurons & symbols, well-known scientific domains.
I'm not aware of "neurons and symbols". I'm aware of feeling, sight, smell, etc.. The fact that consciousness is an experience is what's fundamentally at odds with building a consistent model. Modeling cognition is the easy part.
a), you can have that thought only because of symbols, and b), people without thought can feel, see, smell, etc. I don't see how your argument holds any weight.
> If consciousness is just an emergent property of an incredible complex state machine
it is just an obvious conclusion once you observe the continuous chain of living matter between first clumps of amino acids in primordeal soup 2B+ years ago and you. There is just no point where one can say that consciousness didn't exist before and started exist immediately after. It was just increasing as the complexity of the system increased, and will continue to increase beyond humans. What we call consciousness, the carriers of future consciousness would look at like we look at lizards' consciousness today.
>than any implementation would have to be conscious, the often quoted simulation of a brain inside a computer as well as a gigantic pile of levers, gears and pulleys in the right arrangement.
giving that these examples are simpler than a simple cell, it is no surprise that we don't observe any noticeable consciousness in these examples.
>The thought that a collection of gears can become aware of its existence seems, at least to me, pretty outlandish.
Can a collection of gears, given enough size and complexity, behave in a way as to attempt to maximize entropy it would generate over its whole period of existence? Can it make a copy of itself with modifications as to increase the target entropy achievable by the copy? This 2 "can"s is actually what defines the living matter. Consciousness is just the emerging algorithm of maximizing the target entropy. Self-awareness is just ability of algorithms to observe its own "subroutines".
On top of that, this interpretation is very controversial to say the least. In most interpretations, the role of the 'observer' is left in the middle, as there is no good reason to assume it should be conscious.
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Von_Neumann%E2%80%93Wigner_inte...