> a system that is no longer operational due to its poor safety record
the safety problems with the shuttle were, broadly speaking, hardware problems and not software problems.
from "Appendix F - Personal Observations on Reliability of Shuttle" [0], which was Richard Feynman's appendix to the report on the 1986 Challenger disaster:
> To summarize then, the computer software checking system and attitude is of the highest quality. There appears to be no process of gradually fooling oneself while degrading standards so characteristic of the Solid Rocket Booster or Space Shuttle Main Engine safety systems.
he specifically highlighted the quality of the avionics software as an example of how engineering on a project like the Shuttle could be done well, and wasn't doomed to be low-quality and unsafe simply by virtue of being a large complicated government project.
the safety problems with the shuttle were, broadly speaking, hardware problems and not software problems.
from "Appendix F - Personal Observations on Reliability of Shuttle" [0], which was Richard Feynman's appendix to the report on the 1986 Challenger disaster:
> To summarize then, the computer software checking system and attitude is of the highest quality. There appears to be no process of gradually fooling oneself while degrading standards so characteristic of the Solid Rocket Booster or Space Shuttle Main Engine safety systems.
he specifically highlighted the quality of the avionics software as an example of how engineering on a project like the Shuttle could be done well, and wasn't doomed to be low-quality and unsafe simply by virtue of being a large complicated government project.
0: https://www.nasa.gov/history/rogersrep/v2appf.htm