Why should understanding entirely depend on being "embodied"? This is like defining understanding as "a thing humans do" and then insisting that by definition only humans can do it.
The first link then goes on: "One central element of this view is that we are always projecting possibilities onto the world around us. ... To take an example that Samantha Matherne (2019) uses to illustrate Heidegger’s view: when I first apprehend the martini in front of me, I take it as offering a variety of possibilities—to be sipped, to be thrown, to be shaken, to be stirred. If I then take the martini as to be sipped, I am seizing on one of these possibilities and interpreting the martini in light of this specific possibility." GPT on encountering a martini will similarly consider many possibilities like this; you can run it multiple times or configure it or merely ask it to show these different possibilities it thinks can come from a situation. It seems like this definition has a lot more in common with things GPT does rather than being exclusively related to having a body.
"Why should understanding entirely depend on being 'embodied'?"
By asking such a question you are still considering understanding as an epistemic term and not an ontological category. The example given by Ms. Matherne suffers from the same ontic reduction. I will not even try to give an example of "understanding as ontological category", taking the James Cameron way: the (language) technology is not ready yet, maybe never will; perhaps to give such an example we would require a memory transfer technology [1].
"insisting that by definition only humans can do it"
Yes, this is the entire Heideggerian project: humans as Dasein. Beyond tongue-in-cheek, Heidegger is concerned with the history of Beyng (notice capital B and unusual y, in German he spells it as "Seyn", as opposed to "Sein", the Germans capitalize all nouns by default) in which there is a "first beginning", during the Ancient Greek resolvement of metaphysics (even the word, μετά, beyond, φυσικά, physics, that which grows, is used initially only to group some texts by Aristotle written after Physics), and his search for "the other beginning". This is all very obscure. And Heidegger doesn't help it by literally inventing a language without providing a Rosetta stone. In The Event [2] he has quotes like "'Technology' as the basic truth of history qua happenstance" under the title "163. The Saying", make of it what you will. However, just above "162. The demise of metaphysics", he says "[i]f thinking has passed over into erudition [...] [e]ven those who are thoughtless will then recognize how inessential it is". So he can write clearly also. But again, to quote Edward Feigenbaum, "What does he offer us? Phenomenology! That ball of fluff. That cotton candy!" [3].
Again, this all was to give an example of a thinking with no overlap with GPT. As I see it now, departed from Heidegger's view, the problem is how we continue Galileo's project, "measure what can be measured, and make measurable what cannot be", with or without ontological categories.
The first link then goes on: "One central element of this view is that we are always projecting possibilities onto the world around us. ... To take an example that Samantha Matherne (2019) uses to illustrate Heidegger’s view: when I first apprehend the martini in front of me, I take it as offering a variety of possibilities—to be sipped, to be thrown, to be shaken, to be stirred. If I then take the martini as to be sipped, I am seizing on one of these possibilities and interpreting the martini in light of this specific possibility." GPT on encountering a martini will similarly consider many possibilities like this; you can run it multiple times or configure it or merely ask it to show these different possibilities it thinks can come from a situation. It seems like this definition has a lot more in common with things GPT does rather than being exclusively related to having a body.