Please don't act condescending. The problem of induction is well-known, and is closely related to what you are discussing here. I agree that science can't literally prove any hypothesis is true in the same sense that mathematics/logic can; but we also can't jump from here to considering inductive reasoning an entirely useless tool in the search for truth.
That is the point that I am trying to make: experimentation can bring proof to strengthen a hypothesis. Even if a later experiment invalidates a hypothesis, all of the previous experiments' results don't disappear, and any new hypothesis we formulate still needs to be coherent with them to have any value: we have actually learned something important from our thousand experiments, even if our 1001st showed that the hypothesis we had in mind was false.
Also, this is not unique to science. The same phenomenon can happen in mathematics or logic for theorems that have been neither proven nor disproven yet. We can perform numerical experiments to test a numerical theorem, and gain some amount of confidence in that theorem even if we haven't proven it to be true. We can often establish lower or upper bounds in the course of this experimentation, where we find that the theorem is True at least for some limited subset of all numbers - and this remains True and useful even if it later turns out that there exist counter-examples.
This observation is also very important for understanding why the history of natural philosophy is essentially one of continuous progress, with very little backtracking: even if induction is not good enough to know that we have a perfectly complete and consistent theory (and we will never have one), we always have something salvageable from all of the experimentation done so far. Even geocentric models with their epicycles were actually working models, which predicted the positions of planets in the next 1000 years to quite good accuracy, even if they were clearly wrong in the end.
Please don't accuse me of acting condescending. It's very offensive and hurts my feelings when I'm accused of something I'm not doing.
I am criticizing you, but I am not being condescending. There is a huge difference.
Perhaps the alien thing was bad. I apologize for that. The intent was a joke and was not condescension.
>That is the point that I am trying to make: experimentation can bring proof to strengthen a hypothesis. Even if a later experiment invalidates a hypothesis, all of the previous experiments' results don't disappear, and any new hypothesis we formulate still needs to be coherent with them to have any value: we have actually learned something important from our thousand experiments, even if our 1001st showed that the hypothesis we had in mind was false.
Yes but this was not part of the discussion. We're talking about science as a principle. Not what we have learned from the process of science.
>This observation is also very important for understanding why the history of natural philosophy is essentially one of continuous progress, with very little backtracking: even if induction is not good enough to know that we have a perfectly complete and consistent theory (and we will never have one), we always have something salvageable from all of the experimentation done so far. Even geocentric models with their epicycles were actually working models, which predicted the positions of planets in the next 1000 years to quite good accuracy, even if they were clearly wrong in the end.
Important or not, we diverged from the point. Whether Science is a valid principle shared by humans and aliens is the point. My point is, PG's view isn't even shared with humans, why should he assume it's going to be shared with aliens?
You're talking about the importance of science. The value of science. That's off topic.
> Whether Science is a valid principle shared by humans and aliens is the point. My point is, PG's view isn't even shared with humans, why should he assume it's going to be shared with aliens?
What we're discussing is "the principle that a controlled experiment testing some hypothesis entitles us to have proportionally increased belief in it". Anyone that rejects this principle doesn't know if the sun will rise up tomorrow, is terrified that they may fall through the floor at any moment, or worse, drift off into the enormity of space.
What PG was essentially talking about was that all humans agree on the value of inductive reasoning ("experience") *, despite the philosophical problem of induction. This is far older than any notion of science, and is universal among not just humans, but also life forms on Earth in general (at least plants, fungi, and animals). I honestly very much doubt that it is even possible to function in the world, let alone to build interplanetary communication, if you reject inductive reasoning.
The fact that we can't reconcile inductive and deductive reasoning is a limitation of our philosophical/logical/mathematical systems, not some ultimate truth that invalidates the above principle.
Quite off-topic, but I will also note that I don't really like PG in general, and think much of his argumentation style is unpleasant and often makes undue assumptions. I just happen to strongly agree with (my interpretation of) this particular point.
* admittedly, he did go a step further by mentioning "controlled experiments", which induction doesn't rely on; but I don't think that really modifies the statement. As a toddler, when you place a cube on the ground, look away, and then look back, you're performing a controlled experiment to check if objects have permanence.
>The fact that we can't reconcile inductive and deductive reasoning is a limitation of our philosophical/logical/mathematical systems, not some ultimate truth that invalidates the above principle.
It's not reconciling those two systems. It's reconciling all of logic (induction and deduction) and reality itself. Logic, by logic itself is inapplicable to reality. We live in a universe of unknown domains and imprecise/inconsistent measurements. At any point in time we can make an observation that contradicts a previous observation. This makes proof impossible. While proof is impossible because of the possibility of a contradictory observation, falsification is very possible. The goal of science is falsification, not proof.
This is the logical conclusion of science and therefore reality. Logic, deduction and induction and proof are mostly the domain of mathematics or little axiomatic games we play where we artificially limit the domain. It's a Very very different domain from the one science operates in.
Most of humanity actually agrees deduction and induction are inapplicable to reality. Hence why science is, in the end, the most rigorous form of determining truth (despite the fact that it actually can't) instead of logic. This is in fact the conclusion reached ABOUT reality when we apply logic to it; that logic itself is inapplicable to reality as we know it.
When we check if a cube on the ground 100 times and see that it exists but we can't know what the next 10 billion observations will yield. Perhaps the 100 observations were biased, and the 10 billion subsequent observations yield that cube was a reflection, the toddler was mistaken and the situation did not exist long enough for the toddler to observe the cube past 100 observations.
> Anyone that rejects this principle doesn't know if the sun will rise up tomorrow, is terrified that they may fall through the floor at any moment, or worse, drift off into the enormity of space.
This is my issue with PG. If you look at science rigorously... we actually don't assume this is true. Science cannot verify whether the sun will rise tomorrow or whether or not we will or will not fall through the floor. That is science in a nut shell. PG is saying something WRONG about science and that Aliens will share a belief with us about it.
As for our day to day experiences, you're right. We all believe the sun will rise tomorrow, but this isn't science. This is simply bias, that all humans are born with. We ASSUME the sun will rise tomorrow, but there is no form of reasoning (scientific, deductive or inductive) that can lead us to that conclusion. PG was NOT talking about this. He was talking about Science and controlled experiments. Not shared assumptions about reality.
If PG said, "We assume that Aliens, like us, assume that when we're not looking the cube still exists even though we only observed it a couple of times." then I can probably get behind that, but it is an entirely different statement.
no. Don't agree. Experimentation can't prove anything. It also doesn't strengthen anything. Proof is not a strengthening of something. If you prove something it means it's true.
>Well, the experimentation part, that can bring proof to strength a hypothesis, is something that you agreed to.
>So that part would be shared, that you agreed to.
Never agreed. You misinterpreted. I agreed to this: "we have actually learned something important from our thousand experiments". You learned that for 1000 experiments you observed something. That's it.
You're being pedantic. Obviously I agree with you something was learned. But I disagree with you that anything was proven or established by what was learned.
That is the point that I am trying to make: experimentation can bring proof to strengthen a hypothesis. Even if a later experiment invalidates a hypothesis, all of the previous experiments' results don't disappear, and any new hypothesis we formulate still needs to be coherent with them to have any value: we have actually learned something important from our thousand experiments, even if our 1001st showed that the hypothesis we had in mind was false.
Also, this is not unique to science. The same phenomenon can happen in mathematics or logic for theorems that have been neither proven nor disproven yet. We can perform numerical experiments to test a numerical theorem, and gain some amount of confidence in that theorem even if we haven't proven it to be true. We can often establish lower or upper bounds in the course of this experimentation, where we find that the theorem is True at least for some limited subset of all numbers - and this remains True and useful even if it later turns out that there exist counter-examples.
This observation is also very important for understanding why the history of natural philosophy is essentially one of continuous progress, with very little backtracking: even if induction is not good enough to know that we have a perfectly complete and consistent theory (and we will never have one), we always have something salvageable from all of the experimentation done so far. Even geocentric models with their epicycles were actually working models, which predicted the positions of planets in the next 1000 years to quite good accuracy, even if they were clearly wrong in the end.