Elaborate. Obviously its security depends on the hashing scheme (if it's CRC32, you could find a collision pretty easily), but educate us -- is that all you meant?
To nitpick, the topic at hand is pre-image attacks, not collision attacks. Pre-image is where you know the hash and want the plaintext, collision is where you create two plaintexts with the same hash but don't care about the actual hash value. The former is recovering information, the latter is falsifying trust and almost always involves signatures.
Collision attacks don't apply to many situations but are much easier to execute, for example a MD5 pre-image attack requires approximately 2^128 steps but a collision attack requires only about 2^64 steps. This is why MD5 is totally unsuitable for collision resistance, and in fact has already been successfully exploited to fabricate a real-world CA certificate, but still puts up mild resistance to password cracking. Not that I'm recommending you use it or anything -- do what the nice gentleman says and just use bcrypt already!
Wrong. Collisions can be found in MD5 in 2^21 time due to an attack by Xie and Feng. 2^64 is a very respectable number and is not practical for people to do on their home machines. 2^21 is.
You are right, of course. I wrote that as 'ideal digest' instead of MD5 then rewrote it. Specific digests always lose a few bits in real life, or in MD5's case, most of the bits...
Clarify? Collision attacks by definition do not feature an existing digest as input so they are not useful for breaking into a system secured with a digest.
Ah, I misunderstood. By "collision attack" you meant "find two plaintexts that hash to the same digest", I interpreted it as "find one plaintext that hashes to a specific digest", and "preimage attack" as "find the plaintext that was hashed to this digest".
False.