Yeah, but there's always Popper's observation hovering in the background concerning definitions: 'all definitions involve the use words which themselves remain undefined'. Now if particular constituents of language (nouns, verbs, qualifiers) have empirical referents (EG, oak tree) then something other than words can be supplied to buttress and shape consensus for any formulated definitions, using words which themselves have empirical referents. But with conceptual referents (EG, democracy) definitions become subjective and lack clear capacity for unambiguous validation. So a definition of a concept which resonates with one individual based on their understanding of its verbiage may be dissonant for another based on that individual's understanding of the content of the definition.
You are confusing 'definition' with positivism. A definition does not have to be epistemologically apodictic to be a definition. It simply requires that we can understand its ordinary uses. Do you think nominalists can't define anything, and exist in the world in a state of perpetual confusion and dissonance?
Interesting. But the subject is the nature of the definition. What is the OED definition of definition (circularity intended):
a precise statement of the nature, properties, scope, or essential qualities of a thing; an explanation of a concept, etc.; a statement or formal explanation of the meaning of a word or phrase
Well that's nice. The first component would be amenable to a sclerotic positivism (which denied subjective phenomena as inaccessible to measurement ergo epiphenomena to be ignored; this jettisoned by contemporary cognitivism and phenomenology ); the second addresses the conceptual without a hint of pragmatic methodology; and the salient element of third component is the word meaning which OED defines as:
that which is or is intended to be expressed or indicated by a sentence, word, dream, symbol, action, etc.
So the definition of definition by the ipse dixit English authority on definitions alternates between a call for precision and some rather vague references to intentionality. That was the intent of the above tidbit on the topic of definition. Namely some labels for subjects are amenable to degrees of precision in definition while others with only conceptual referents will have their proffered definitions disputed, diluted, or otherwise hedged and seemingly imprecise.
Steven Stitch in Fragmentation of Reason which is a personal overview of contemporary epistemology alludes to the inherent vagueness of consensual definitions and eventually settles into what he calls pragmatic epistemology
"Namely some labels for subjects are amenable to degrees of precision in definition while others with only conceptual referents will have their proffered definitions disputed, diluted, or otherwise hedged and seemingly imprecise."
It doesn't matter how contested a word is. You can nevertheless describe its main conventional uses. That would simply be an empirical observation.
Also, just a friendly suggestion: you are writing too much, and using too many long and unnecessary words. Simplicity is often better, both analytically, and to read.
