The Congress will get every shred of legislation they can suck from the desperation of the Obama Administration to have it pass. No legislator wants to have their name on the bill before elections, especially without official support from the head of parties. So it's only going to happen, even though basically everyone in the hall of Washington want it, if there's enough collateral or safety in it for each of the signees.
If it doesn't pass in the Lame Duck it's likely to be fielded in the first couple years of the next administration after it gets established, likely with some face-saving side legislation "oh with this economic stimulus (e.g. TPA) or additional clause regarding currency manipulation suddenly the TPP is a great deal!"
The establishment know that TPP is about national power - economically containing China by isolating it from major trading partners. Soon it will begin to field this in a 'PR friendly form' ("US has to write the rules or China will") to US citizens through official statements and press releases, in the hopes of getting broader appeal by more explicit support for it's most significant features.
I think it's really likely to pass, though not without a groaning and distrustful public - who will view the TPP (much because its true) - as a measure for the economy that further concentrates wealth, protecting and empowering the industries, technologies and investments that are already at the peak of the domestic economy - while forcing those at the lowest to compete for space even more.
The TPP I don't think is falling apart so much as it's starting to have to see a little real sunlight, because the public hasn't bought into the "Free Trade" (TM) labeling it carries. Few understand that the alternatives to the TPP pushed by China (CREC, etc) are also - in fact probably even more in the most traditional sense - 'free trade' deals; instead they have a basic idea that the TPP isn't exactly what Washington says that it is and that the machinations about how it's going to be good for the US economy doesn't mean that the 'goodness' will be charitably and judiciously applied across the economy.
Ultimately we're in for some pretty interesting stage productions out of K Street for the next few months.
> The establishment know that TPP is about national power - economically containing China by isolating it from major trading partners.
Can anyone explain how this works exactly? The most plausible explanation I've seen is that it can prevent China exporting counterfeits of American goods to Indonesia, for instance.
This presumes the Indonesian government is actually going to be proactive about enforcement. But while it may be a boon to some American companies I don't see how it causes China to be isolated. China is still free to export non-counterfeit goods. It's still free to export goods counterfeited from companies who lack the resources to pursue international enforcement. And quite frankly, it's still free to export the rest with an appropriate application of subterfuge.
To summarize what could take pages: it's about excluding China from the ability to trade in it's region. Imagine if an adversary of the United States (China, Russia) created an economic trade block with Canada, Mexico, Panama, Cuba, Japan, and Western Europe that excluded the United States.
This would damage the state power of America for a number of reasons: America would lose out in financial aspect of state competition, the adversary would gain the ability to cut off supply chains and sources important to military competition (everything from munitions to silicon), and the adversary would build positive relationships with the neighbor states (which becomes especially helpful if they can be aggressed toward supporting one side of a power conflict).
Furthermore, the ability to trade with neighbors of an adversary nation allows a country to 'balance' them to greater ability: making them compete with one another in certain sectors, furnishing them with particular military and intelligence capabilities, otherwise giving more say in what the power relationships look like. The foreign adversary can use that to their advantage to shape the region.
Within the TPP itself contain a number of intellectual property laws and international dispute proceedures that have been negotiated by every power in the region with the exception of China. That is to say, were China later to join in the trade bloc of its region, it would fight an uphill struggle with every intellectual property dispute and state settlement case because it wasn't at the table to negotiate and agree to terms that would be mutually fair.
Indeed, the former chief economist for the World Bank has said "The American posture, having designed a Pacific Trade Agreement, that was crafted in a way that whatever was legally possible made it not practically realistic for China to participate."
Think damned-if-you-do-damned-if-you-don't. That's what makes the TPP such good economic and security policy.
It is the US ambition to have better tools for containing China as it is the preeminent rising power on the world stage, which immediately makes it a potential security risk to the United States.
The strengthening of containment policies through the TPP is of course not the only lever of foreign policy. The paper linked above suggests a number of other activities such as aggravating and potentially occupying North Korea on China's southern border, building stronger relationships between US allies (SK and Japan) and engaging in lawfare and propaganda to problematize China's national security interests in the South China Sea (where historically it has been incredibly vulnerable to military blockade).
If it doesn't pass in the Lame Duck it's likely to be fielded in the first couple years of the next administration after it gets established, likely with some face-saving side legislation "oh with this economic stimulus (e.g. TPA) or additional clause regarding currency manipulation suddenly the TPP is a great deal!"
The establishment know that TPP is about national power - economically containing China by isolating it from major trading partners. Soon it will begin to field this in a 'PR friendly form' ("US has to write the rules or China will") to US citizens through official statements and press releases, in the hopes of getting broader appeal by more explicit support for it's most significant features.
I think it's really likely to pass, though not without a groaning and distrustful public - who will view the TPP (much because its true) - as a measure for the economy that further concentrates wealth, protecting and empowering the industries, technologies and investments that are already at the peak of the domestic economy - while forcing those at the lowest to compete for space even more.
The TPP I don't think is falling apart so much as it's starting to have to see a little real sunlight, because the public hasn't bought into the "Free Trade" (TM) labeling it carries. Few understand that the alternatives to the TPP pushed by China (CREC, etc) are also - in fact probably even more in the most traditional sense - 'free trade' deals; instead they have a basic idea that the TPP isn't exactly what Washington says that it is and that the machinations about how it's going to be good for the US economy doesn't mean that the 'goodness' will be charitably and judiciously applied across the economy.
Ultimately we're in for some pretty interesting stage productions out of K Street for the next few months.