While the argument is probably right, the author may notice he's asking AI websites on AI water usage. Perhaps he should consult more neutral sources, at least to introduce the habit of critical thinking.
It looks like that by simply reducing use in welding, lifting, and purging gas (all with clear alternatives) and maybe also 'leak detection' and 'other' (not expounded on in the article), they can fill in for the entire Qatari output, and that's without including extra production and recycling which is quiet possible.
Oracle are actually subletting part of Bynet's new-ish Har Hotzvim facility which has 2,400 racks but is probably power-constrained - I believe it had 16 MW when it went live, with passive provision for doubling that. Even if it's since been upgraded, that's still only 13 kW per rack which is pretty stingy these days.
As a very rough rule of thumb building down is about 4x more expensive than building up. So probably worth doing if you're Shin Bet (who I believe also have space in the same dc), but for the likes of Oracle it's only going to be used to serve clients with specific security requirements. Think of it as a halo project - more of a marketing exercise than something that's actually going to be used by the average customer.
The same goes for datacentres hosted in cold war bunkers etc - they always end up being too constrained in one way or another to be useful. The big facilities end up being built above ground and rely on geographic redundancy rather than trying to make themselves (literally) bomb-proof.
Iran claims 1T USD damages as a result of US leaving JCPOA alone - in 2021. Now add in 5 more years, wars, sanctions before JCPOA was signed, direct expenditures on enrichment...
That's their claim for how much less economic activity Iran (not just the government) had in total due to sanctions, not how much the government "spent on the nuclear weapons program" that could have instead been spent on desalination plants.
But without a nuclear weapons program, the entire sanctions regime wouldn't have started (yea, I know today half of those are anti-terrorist sanctions, but that's not how it started, it was morphed later on). It should be considered as part of the losses.
A treaty whose key articles would start expiring in.. late 2025. Which Iran had no motivation whatsoever to extend had it being kept (imagine this Iran but with 2-4 trillion dollars more, more than a few going to drones and missiles). You'd have this war but on way worse terms.
Yea, the US joined in in 2025, what should it imply about a future war? The assumption that Iran doesn't know who's bombing it sounds rather dubious. If anything, it should be very much in their interest to assume away US involvement unless 100% proven, given fighting an additional enemy tend to be very bad and US is so powerful. Unless...
Maybe the strategic balance creates a situation where it's advantageous for Iran to pull US in regardless of non-involvement. They don't do well against Israel alone (see rather low damage of 4 separate large scale attempts at attacking Israel directly), but US is so much easier to pressure via the Gulf. Indeed, this scenario doesn't quite need Israel.
So US risked getting pulled in not due to attacking in June 2025, but because the cheque given to the Gulf was starting to expire, the power balance was objectively swinging in favor of Iran at the location where Devereaux sees as the most important part of the Middle East. Now, say there are powerful states who feel they are in a decent position now but also that the strategic balance would slip away. What do they tend to do? Devereaux can consult his WW1 history.
We saw regime collapses in the Arab Spring - it's not a simple or short process, most regimes survived (either directly or via reversion). Even when a regime was overthrown, the replacement was usually not more hostile to Israel. e.g. Syria isn't more hostile than it was. Thing is there isn't all that much 'fury' since Arabs already assume the worst of Israel, while reasons for relative peace remain as is or are actually strengthened by the revolution process (e.g. economy, desire for quiet following violent revolution, new regime wanting to establish itself, etc.)
Look, it's a done deal. Some of the choices Wayland made are not to my liking, there will be a long term cost (even static linking won't save you from differing protocol implementations). But it's done and there's no point in complaining.
(Running X11 right now, I'll switch when the distro forces me to, in hope I'll get a bug free experience after everyone else runs it)
Is this not the heart of the problem? Israel has been killing Iranians for years. Nobody can guarantee that Israel would not break a cease fire when they feel like it.
I fear that both sides are acting completely rational: Israel wants to wipe out Iran and Iran is doing whatever they can to survive.
Nobody forced Iran to bomb gas and oil fields that aren't even of their enemies, and to start doing it before Pars was bombed (e.g. Shah gas field was targeted 2 days ago). Place the blame on Iran who is actually 'wrecking Asia' and not the ones fighting it.
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