He seems pretty unequivocal in the video: https://youtu.be/2HMPRXstSvQ . He even points out that it’s something which he’s claimed previously, ruling out the idea that it was some kind of spur-of-the-moment conclusion.
Perhaps, but as the other article points out, the human requirement in radiology has a lot to do with legal and insurance requirements. This is similar to how a lawyer may not be better than an AI but the job is still exclusive to humans.
Additionally, a top-division European soccer team also typically plays something like 34 or 38 league games every season, and that doesn’t include things like domestic cups and European competition.
Excellent point. I hadn’t even considered the number of games. Good players will play over 2500 minutes in a season. That is a completely different type of wear and tear.
There's no clean separation between those things. The weakness and inadequacy of HTTP(S) and other protocols actively funnels people into the centralised services of big providers. It creates a world where storage is brittle and content is ephemeral, both directly due to its own failings and because it pushes people towards big providers who increasingly like things that way; and so on. Now human nature would be enough to tend to draw a lot of people towards lowest-common-denominator options, but a system which makes the alternatives frictionful and downright painful doesn't help either.
It's not a panacea or a magic fix for human nature, but one of the root causes of this is that the underlying architecture of the HTTP(S) Web is just inadequate. The world needs (technically viable and widely-used systems of) content-addressable storage: inherently achivable, mirrorable and recoverable, properly supporting intermittent connections, providing the stability which is the necessary (though not sufficient) base for building things like annotations and back-linking. That certainly can't force people not to choose the laziest and stupid options, but it really can't hurt if at least the underlying technology doesn't make doing anything but the laziest and stupidest thing inherently hard, esoteric and unrewarding. Instead we've created TV on the computer from the visionary Doug Engelbart manifesto Don't Create TV on the Computer. Worse, some people still seem to be trying to pat themselves on the back for the supposed pragmatism and savviness of those decisions, even while at the same time using their other hand to wave a fist at the Big Tech incumbents, content farms and grifters which they gave a structural advantage to. There aren't many things which should be a higher priority, and which are a bigger blocker of general improvement, than the continuing lack of widely adopted and widely adoptable content-addressable storage. Need to do something big about that, folks, and promptly.
1) more reliance on systems to track reputation across projects. I'm sure Microsoft, in the form of GitHub, will love to sell you a partial fix to the same problems it so enthusiastically helped to create. But there are the familiar problems of surveillance, identity theft, office politics, and system-gaming, and it doesn't on its own offer an onramp for new players.
2) in-person coding tests at the same Pearson test centres where people take most of their Cisco (and accounting, and ...) exams today. Not as expensive or inconvenient as you might think, but not the cheapest and easiest, and it certainly has the same concerns re. surveillance and identity theft
That's not really right, though the license is still Open Source compliant. Linux was practising an open, patches-welcome developement style before the forges existed, on its mailing list. This did indeed contrast with how eg. the FSF was running its projects, though even in those the door wasn't shut as hard on people wanting to contribute as Ladybird's now is, I think. Then Eric Raymond wrote "The Cathedral and the Bazaar" specifically to talk up Linux's patches-welcome development model, and to move the emphasis away from (just) licensing terms and source accessibility, to openness to patches. Netscape then launched the Mozilla Project specifically on the CatB model. In response to the surge of momentum, the "Open Source" label was created basically as a brand name for the CatB perspective. After all this, "doing it as open source" was established as a clear mental category in people's heads, and the forges popped up as low-friction SaaS solutions for something that people already wanted to do, and by then were often already doing. (In the process helping to make Web-based SaaS a well-established concept and business model in people's heads, something with ironic consequences.) So Ladybird's current development model is much more clearly in line with the Free Software philosophy than the Open Source philosophy. To be clear, that's not the only disagreement or difference of emphasis between "Free Software" and "Open Source": most obvioulsy, Ladybird's BSD license is a failing in the FSF's view of things, just not enough of a failing make Ladybird not Free Software. But it is a real one.
"The Cathedral and Bazaar" is orthogonal to open source. Its argument is that open source is most valuable when paired with the bazaar model, not that the cathedral model cannot be considered open.
The open source definition was created in that mind. It does not state or imply open development or a community are requirements.
CatB and Open Source aren't coaxial, but there wasn't a very clean separation between them either: https://www.free-soft.org/literature/papers/esr/cathedral-ba...https://web.archive.org/web/20021001164015/http://www.openso... . "[T]he same pragmatic, business-case grounds that motivated Netscape" was CatB. Even now OSI doesn't emphasise any separation: https://opensource.org/about . You are correct: the Open Source Definition does not mandate an open development model. However that's probably at least in a small part because, well, how would one craft a legal requirement for open development in a software license that wasn't either unenforceable or very burdensome and abusable? It's also quite definitely because the expectation was that forks and/or the threat of forks would in practice enforce a certain level of open development on OSD-compatibly-licensed software: this was in fact what ended up happening to GCC at least once https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Compiler_Collection#EGCS_f... . If software projects all largely go the way Ladybird is going now, and stay that way, then it's a crushing (though not total) defeat for what the Open Source movement promoted and what it hoped to achieve; but sure, to be clear, Ladybird remains OSD-compliant. (Not total because at least the source remains available, without paying or signing anything, for bug-hunting.)
That's not entirely true. It's certainly the case that Ladybird is still under an open-source license, but the whole idea of the "Open Source" label was to move the emphasis away from having a free license to actually being open to patches in practice.
But that's a bit backwards. RMS would emphatically agree that Free Software doesn't mean being open to contributions; if you asked him about either "FOSS" or "Open Source" he'd probably command you to wash your mouth out with soap. It's the other side of the fighting FOSS family which evangelised for Linux-like development (see the thread from https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48410503 ).
> Shortly afterwards, in 1974, developers squeezed a reduced PDP-8/A logic board into a VT50 terminal and demonstrated it as one of two potential personal computer products to Olsen. To their disappointment (including a young David Ahl), he vetoed them also on the advice of management concerned it would cut into existing product lines, making the infamous observation that no one would want a computer in their home.
This effort was led by Tom Stockebrand, who had previously worked on a number of MIT Lincoln Labs and/or Wes Clarke machines, such as the LINC, which are celebrated for looking a bit like personal computers if you squint. (See Digital at Work, Jamie Parker Pearson ed., ISBN 0-13-213489-6 https://www.computerhistory.org/pdp-1/_media/pdf/dec.digital... pp. 90-1 :
> “One version was going to have a PDP-8 built into this slot in the back, along with a cassette tape drive that could be used like DECtape. The cost goal was $600. Even in 1971, that was dirt cheap for what would have been the first personal computer.”
Overall, this may have been one of the most important turning points in the history of the personal-computer market, and it's surely one of the biggest omissions from the usual telling of that story. The capabilities and form factor weren't all that new—the Datapoint 2200 and the Wang 2200 had already launched that decades, two bright red warning flares for the industry—but anything like a $600 price would have been quite something for the time.
> Barely a month after, the emergence of the IBM PC 5150 in August and its rapid sales sent a shockwave through the industry, causing Olsen to abruptly reconsider his negative opinion of the personal computer segment.
There's probably quite a lot of dramatic irony in this. I suspect that Digital's and Olsen's long-term ambition was usually for DEC to grab IBM's mainframe crown. That was probably the default long-term ambition for anyone in the computer business before the 1990s, but moreover the history of DEC—from Olsen coming out of his secondment from SAGE to IBM manufacturing muttering that he could do much better, to Gordon Bell's "VAX strategy" which aimed to put byte-addressed VAX-instruction-set machines in nearly every product category in a notably System 360ish way, to the decision to charge IBM's mainframe guns with the VAX 9000—mostly seems to suggest that that was the dream. To see IBM then tonk Digital and transform the whole industry with an IBM microcomputer must have set their heads spinning. Small consolation to them that it turned out to be the beginning of the end of IBM's dominance, too.
> To see IBM then tonk Digital and transform the whole industry with an IBM microcomputer must have set their heads spinning.
Indeed. Perhaps it's a mercy that DEC didn't know at the time that the thing that 'tonked' them was really an "almost didn't happen" skunk works sponsored directly by Thomas Watson over the objections of most of his staff. While there were probably a few wild-eyed true believers in the Boca Raton ranks, to IBM senior management the 5150 was much more a small experiment to learn about these emerging desktop systems and perhaps a tiny hedge against low-end encroachment than any belief the future of computing would be desktop micros.
It's ironic that the 5150 PC that took out the minis then escaped and turned on its creators, unleashing the margin-eating barbarian horde. I've always interpreted IBM's failed PS/2, OS/2 and micro-channel efforts as an attempt to recapture and tame the monster their little experiment had accidentally unleashed. The fascinating question is: if IBM senior management had really believed the PC would become huge, how would the 5150 have been different? And would that less OTS and more proprietary machine have launched the PC juggernaut at all?
That delay in shipping a memory-protected Mac was probably originally at least as much the result of upper-management politics as anything else. After Jobs left Apple Gassée cancelled Jobs’ pet project, the Big Mac which was intended to run Mac applications on a Unix base. Big Mac project leader Rich Page (and IIRC some other project members) rang Steve Jobs begging him to do something, and the rest is history.
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